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A traditional task for Christian theology has been the need to un­
derstand the place of Christianity among the multitude of religions and 
the meaning of those religions for Christians. Endeavors of this sort 
can ordinarily be found under the classification “theology of reli­
gions.” Often these theologies are based on a theory of religion in 
general in which specific religions are interpreted from a privileged stand­
point within which all religions appear as examples. Today, a small 
but growing number of theologians are expressing dissatisfaction with 
such top-down approaches to religious pluralism. They point out the 
tendency of such theologies to interpret religions either as irreducibly 
different (witness Karl Barth’s rejection of religion in favor of revela­
tion) or as simply more of the same (as with Karl Rahner’s “anony­
mous Christian”). Instead of an all-encompassing theology of reli­
gions, they are engaging in detailed studies of the texts and symbols of 
specific religious traditions in the hope of eventually correlating their 
findings critically with Christian texts. In place of a theology of reli­
gions, these theologians are turning to what may be called a “compara­
tive theology.”
Comparative theology is still very much in the process of working 
out its methods and procedures. What constitutes good comparison? 
Emphasizing only differences can easily become an exercise in apologe­
tics while excusing the theologian from his or her constructive respon­
sibilities. Neither is emphasizing only similarities helpful: appreciating 
the real differences between religions very often proves to be the occa-
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sion for deepening our own religious understanding. In my view, the 
comparative theologian needs to ask how a careful study of another 
religion enables and requires us to revise our understanding of the 
Christian tradition. This will require not only the recognition of similar­
ities and differences, but the willingness to risk new interpretations of 
Christian truths in the light of these findings.
A noteworthy example of a comparative theology is John Keenan’s 
The Meaning of Christ: A Mahayana Theology.1 Keenan uses Maha­
yana Buddhist metaphysics (especially Madhyamika and Yogacar a 
thought) in lieu of Platonism to interpret anew the doctrine of the 
Christ for Christianity. In effect, he asks how a Mahayana reading of 
classical Christian texts allows us to enlarge our understanding of the 
truth of Christ. Another example of a comparative theologian at work 
is John Cobb’s Beyond Dialogue.2 In contrast to Keenan, who is in­
terested in using Buddhist thought as a lens for reading Christian texts 
in new ways, Cobb traces similarities and differences in the two 
religions as a way of working toward their mutual transformation. 
As an example of comparative theology, Donald Mitchell’s book, 
Spirituality and Emptiness: The Dynamics of Spiritual Life in Bud­
dhism and Christianity,3 bears more resemblance to Cobb’s approach 
than to Keenan’s. Unlike either Cobb or Keenan, however, Mitchell 
has chosen to focus on spirituality more than systematic theology 
(although, as the reader shall see, Mitchell’s spirituality is dense with 
doctrinal concerns). Since this point is crucial for appreciating the im­
portance of this book, allow me a few words regarding “spirituality” 
or “spiritual theology” as an academic enterprise.
1 John P. Keenan, The Meaning of Christ: A Mahayana Theology (Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989).
2 John Cobb, Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity 
and Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
3 Donald Mitchell, Spirituality and Emptiness: The Dynamics of Spiritual Life in 
Buddhism and Christianity (New York: Paulist Press, 1991).
4 Bernard McGinn, “The Letter and the Spirit: Spirituality as an Academic Dis­
cipline,” in Christian Spirituality Bulletin: Journal of the Society for the Study of 
Christian Spirituality, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1993), p. 4. McGinn also cites Italian medievalist
The study of spirituality and its relationship to Christian theology is 
much debated. Bernard McGinn has recently commented on the near 
“total semantic chaos” characteristic of the discussion.4 The roots of 
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the problem can be traced back at least to the rise of scholastic theo­
logy in Europe. In the first several centuries of Christianity’s devel­
opment in Western Europe, theological reflection on doctrine was 
inseparable from the monastic practice of asceticism. This began to 
change when theology moved from the monastery to the university in 
the twelfth century. As for the word “spirituality” itself, in the Chris­
tian scriptures, we find the Apostle Paul contrasting sarx (flesh) and 
pneuma (spirit), by which he intended not a dualism of the material 
and the immaterial, but rather a contrast between a life lived in subser­
vience to egocentric appetites and a life lived in God-given freedom. 
Paul also rendered pneuma as an adjective (pneumatikos) in order to 
describe what has been transformed by the power of God. Mitchell is 
not concerned with the various attempts to define the study of spiri­
tuality. Midway through this book’s course, however, he does speak of 
spirituality as “a mode of spiritual living that enhances one’s trans­
formation in God.” To study this mode of living is not to exclude 
Christian doctrine, but certainly it is to emphasize its existential 
import.
Mitchell’s turn to spirituality is calculated. A theme common to 
many Kyoto School authors is their emphasis on the “existential” 
meaning of their claims.5 This is evident in authors such as Nishitani 
Keiji, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi and Abe Masao whose concern for the 
religious fate of the modern world is explicit. Even though it is less evi­
dent in figures such as Nishida Kitard and Tanabe Hajime, to read these 
authors without an appreciation of their concern for the concrete dy­
namics of religious living is to run the risk of a serious misreading. It is 
precisely in this forum that Mitchell wishes to engage the Kyoto School 
and this is what dictates his turn to Christian spirituality. But, the most 
significant contribution of this book is not that Mitchell responds to
Oustavo Vinay’s claim that the term *‘spirituality” is ‘‘a necessary pscudoconcept we 
don’t know how to replace.” See “’Spiritualita’: Invito a una discussione,” in Studia 
Medievali 3a serie 2 (1961).
5 Notice, therefore, that the term “spirituality” is more and more being applied to 
religions other than Christianity. I find it not at all suprising that a member of the 
Kyoto School, Takeuchi Yoshinori, should be the chief editor of the recent volume of 
the “world spirituality” series. See Buddhist Spirituality, Takeuchi Yoshinori, ed. 
(New York: Crossroad, 1993).
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the Kyoto School from the perspective of Christian spirituality instead 
of systematic theology. Rather, it is that Mitchell uses the insights of 
the Kyoto School as a means of carrying on his own explorations of the 
Christian spiritual life. This means that the book will be a disappoint­
ment to some and a breath of fresh air to others. It will disappoint 
Christians (and no doubt some Buddhists as well) accustomed to ap­
proaching spirituality from the standpoint of psychology. Likewise it 
will disappoint a metaphysically-minded readership interested in the 
technical problems regarding the relationship between Christian theism 
and Nishida’s philosophy. For the former, Mitchell’s text will be too 
much concerned with doctrine. For the latter, its major claims will not 
be argued in sufficient detail. Critics from both camps need to be 
reminded that Mitchell’s interest throughout the book remains Chris­
tian spirituality.
In the course of this project, Mitchell treats of a great deal of materi­
al from both the Kyoto School and the Christian spiritual tradition. 
The first half of each of the seven chapters summarizes the thought of a 
Kyoto School philosopher. Mitchell’s reflections on spirituality follow 
as a response. This procedure succeeds well in placing Nishida, Nishi- 
tani, Abe, Tanabe, Takeuchi, Hisamatsu and Tokiwa Gishin in conver­
sation with figures from Christian spirituality such as Teresa of Avila, 
John of the Cross, Thomas Merton and especially Chiara Lubich, foun­
dress of a lay-oriented spiritual renewal movement known as Focolare. 
Material is organized around the theme of kenosis (self-emptying) in 
Christian spirituality. The first chapter deals with the theology of crea­
tion as the kenosis of God which lends itself naturally to a discussion 
of Nishida’s seminal notion of absolute nothingness. Chapter two 
deals with the “negative kenosis of humankind” which is the Fall. 
Here, Nishitani’s protest against secularism serves as the conversation 
partner. In the third chapter, Abe’s kenotic approach to Christology 
sparks a discussion of the Christian doctrine of redemption. The fol­
lowing two chapters, devoted to the theme of sanctification, brings 
Tanabe and Takeuchi and their use of Shinran into view. In the sixth 
chapter, devoted to renewal movements in Buddhism and Christianity, 
we find a comparison of the FAS Society in Kyoto with the Focolare 
movement. The final chapter is given over to Mary, the mother of Je­
sus, as a model of Christian spirituality.
Issues of substantial interest raised by this book are too numerous
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even to summarize. I will touch on but a few.
The first chapter of the book offers us a perspective on what Mitchell 
takes to be a fundamental difference between the Christian mystical 
experience of God and the Buddhist experience of emptiness (as articu­
lated in Nishida’s notion of absolute nothingness). In his final essay on 
religion, Nishida asserts that God and the self arise mutually out of ab­
solute nothingness, which is at once the formlessness out of which all 
forms arise and the absolute “near side” of reality which overcomes 
the dualism of transcendence and immanence. But according to Mitch­
ell, this experience of “Void” (Mitchell’s word, and not, in my view, a 
suitable translation of ku or zettai mu as used by Nishida) is not yet the 
fullness of Christian mystical experience. Against Nishida, Mitchell 
claims that the living God of Christian faith does not arise correlatively 
with the finite self out of absolute nothingness. And against some of 
Nishida’s interpreters, he argues that the Christian God is not a per­
sonification of an infinite principle which is ultimately formless. Abso­
lute nothingness does not appear within consciousness as an object. 
Rather, it forms the “place” (basho) within which subjectivity and the 
world of objects arise. On this point, Mitchell is in agreement with 
Nishida. However, Mitchell does not think of absolute nothingness as 
an onto-theological category. It is, rather, a way of experiencing the 
world.
Absolute Nothingness is not a ‘something’ that attracts our at­
tention. Rather, it is a transparent “nothing” that directs our 
attention to the forms of life in a new and compassionate 
way. [p. 25]
And this qualification leads Mitchell to observe a difference between 
Buddhism and Christianity of the deepest dye. Christian mystics also 
are familiar with this Void into which the personal God is annihilated 
in nothingness. But for Christians, formless nothingness is merely a 
passage leading to the revelation of the Living God beyond the Void. 
Thus, in the fullness of Christian mystical experience, the Void itself is 
given form by the grace of the God who constitutes the “far side” of 
the Void’s “near side.”
Simply put, the particular mystical experience of the Void 
into which the personal God seems to disappear is only a par­
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rial experience of that Void. There is another dimension to 
the mystical experience that must be added for it to be zfull 
Christian experience. So, I would propose that while the Bud­
dhist experience of Emptiness perceives no far side apart 
from the near side, a Christian mystic finds that through 
the grace of Christ indwelling within, he or she is given a 
“spiritual eye,” as it were, to see into the mystery of the 
Void. And he or she finds therein a far-side dimension that is 
not absolutely identified with the near side of creation, and is 
not formless and impersonal, [pp. 24-25]
This “far side,” Mitchell argues, is in fact the Christian Trinity. Initial­
ly, the three persons of the Trinity appear out of the Void. In the full­
ness of Christian mystical experience, the Void is experienced as a field 
of experience established by the kenosis of the three persons. In other 
words, the Trinity is not a derivative reality emerging as form out of 
the formless, but rather the reverse: it is absolute nothingness that 
arises kenotically out of the intra-Trinitarian relations.
Those familiar with Nishida’s writings will find much to object to 
here. Some, no doubt, will want to argue that Mitchell’s “Void” is 
in fact relative nothingness and not absolute nothingness.6 Mitchell’s 
notion of God as the “far side” of the formless Void is perhaps in­
felicitous. However, disciples of Nishida may want to think again. 
Mitchell’s theological qualification of absolute nothingness has merit 
to the extent that it tries to offer a corrective to the monistic tendencies 
in Nishida’s thought. Absolute nothingness, as articulated by Nishida, 
is not a metaphysical monism. Yet as with other examples of Japanese 
hongaku thought, it lends itself readily to rhetorical strategies which 
privilege the totality and unity of phenomena beyond discriminating 
consciousness. Nishida’s notion of absolute nothingness is then easily 
misinterpreted as a metaphysical monism. Misunderstood in this way, 
absolute nothingness is not only unacceptable to Christian theism, it is 
bad Buddhism as well. Nishida’s thought needs to be developed with 
6 Abe Masao, in his “Preface” to Spirituality and Emptiness, notes that Mitchell's 
argument on this point “is one of the most provocative and suggestive sections in the 
book, and deserves serious consideration by persons seeking to understand the relation­
ship of God to Emptiness” (see p. xi).
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more attention to this issue. Mitchell’s insistence on the non-dual 
‘‘otherness” of the Christian God might serve as starting point for 
reflection.7
7 Elsewhere I have argued that the Kyoto School’s encounter with Christian theism 
might fruitfully lead to a reassessment of Tanabe’s criticism of Nishida. Tanabe’s sense 
of the non-dual otherness of absolute nothingness, explored in his turn to Shinran’s 
doctrine of other-power (tariki), is not sufficiently appreciated in Japan.
Mitchell’s position on absolute nothingness also allows him to 
highlight what he considers a genuinely interesting difference distin­
guishing Buddhism and Christianity. Buddhism’s emphasis on the ab­
solute near side arising as the emptiness of all beyond discriminating 
consciousness leads it to the practice of compassion. In contrast, 
Christianity’s affirmation of a far side in mystical experience leads it to 
the practice of love. This is Mitchell at his most provocative. Is there a 
real difference between love (agape) and compassion (karunO)! If there 
is, can the two be distinguished phenomenologically? If so, what poten­
tial does Buddhist compassion hold for transforming and deepening 
the Christian spiritual practice of love? It would be worth hearing more 
from Mitchell on this theme.
A second issue of interest has to do with Mitchell’s treatment of 
Tanabe. A fundamental difference between Nishida and Tanabe is the 
latter’s emphasis on the religious as a concrete event of grace resulting 
in the transformation of awareness. Regarding absolute nothingness, 
Tanabe and Nishida are in agreement that the absolute does not form a 
metaphysical substratum. Tanabe parts company with his teacher over 
Nishida’s use of the metaphor “place” (basho) for absolute nothing­
ness. In Tanabe’s view, absolute nothingness is not a tdpos intuitable 
by means of non-discriminating consciousness. Rather, it is known 
“metanoetically” in the transforming event of religious conversion 
through other-power. Thus, instead of Nishida’s “place,” Tanabe ad­
vances his idea of “absolute mediation” (zettai baikai) in which the ab­
solute is present only as relative being.
When Mitchell asks if other-power can be identified with the Chris­
tian doctrine of grace, the answer we are given is a surprisingly unequiv­
ocal “no.” However similar they may appear phenomenologically, the 
two are not the same. In this respect Mitchell’s position seems to resem­
ble Karl Barth’s rejection of JddoshinshQ. Christian grace implies “a 
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notion of the absolute that is not ‘absolutely’ identified with the trans­
formative process of existence” [p. 93]. Therefore, “in Christian sanc­
tification,” Mitchell claims, “one is opened up to something more 
than the sanctification process itself” [p. 94], To be sure, Christianity 
recognizes that the action of grace requires a mediating role on the part 
of finite things. However, in Christian mysticism, unlike Jddoshinshu,
One is aware of the mediation of the absolute as being a 
Trinitarian mediation of God-Love that is an activity of the 
Trinity itself. One recognizes the mediating Trinitarian struc­
ture to existence, but also sees that this structure reflects some­
thing else, something that the Christian calls “Abba,” 
Father, [p. 94]
Moreover, to distinguish this “something else” from Tanabe’s views 
on the mediation of absolute nothingness, Mitchell argues that Abba 
is a manifestation. Thus it seems that while metanoia through Bud­
dhist other-power leads to a mediation of the absolute by finite being, 
in contrast, metanoia through Christian grace leads to a manifestation 
of ultimate reality as Abba.
How does Mitchell’s manifestation differ from Tanabe’s mediation? 
Is it to be construed as an empirical experience unavailable to Bud­
dhists? Seemingly not. Is it to be understood as a supernatural 
phenomenon bestowed on Christians but not on Buddhists? Such a 
view is very reminiscent of Barth’s a priori rejection of Jddoshinshu. 
Barth could walk blithely away from the appreciable phenomenologi­
cal resemblances between JOdoshinshfl’s other-power and Christian 
grace because of his decidedly unmediated understanding of revelation 
as the “incommensurate.” What docs it mean to say that Buddhist 
other-power is mediated by finite being but Christian grace implies a 
manifestation of Abba? Do Christians enjoy an unmediated (incom­
mensurate) experience of the absolute which simply excludes Bud­
dhists? Tanabe’s notion of absolute mediation has much more to teach 
Christianity than Mitchell is willing to grant. At the very least it may 
suggest a way of understanding the action of grace sacramentally 
without presupposing a supernatural world.
A third issue worthy of comment is Mitchell’s skillful use of Kyoto 
School thought in exploring the relationship between ascetics and mys­
ticism for Christianity. A traditional task for Christian spirituality has 
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been to articulate the relationship between religious discipline and the 
mystical infusion of grace. This problem parallels the doctrinal prob­
lem of the relationship between grace and nature. How is the reality of 
grace related to the spiritual quest? As a way of constructing a model 
for understanding this issue, Mitchell draws our attention to Zen and 
JOdoshinsha and finds abundant resources for Christian spirituality in 
the Kyoto School. Commenting on his own JOdoshinsha tradition, 
Takeuchi Yoshinori notes that salvation arises where the noble quest 
for enlightenment meets the compassion of Amida. In contrast to the 
other-power orientation of Pure Land Buddhism, Zen is often criti­
cized as a self-power path. Ueda Shizuteru, however, argues that Zen 
enlightenment does not arise through ego-assertion, but rather through 
the death of the ego. Does this not suggest that Zen too is an “other- 
power” path? Mitchell notes that while Zen places more attention on 
the quest than JOdoshinsha, both see the “shipwreck” of the ego and 
the birth of the True Self as a work not of the finite ego.
The preceding discussion places Mitchell in a position to note that 
Christianity bears some resemblance with both JOdoshinsha and Zen. 
Like Zen, Christianity holds that there are practices which promote the 
death of the finite ego and like JOdoshinsha, Christianity believes that 
even this is grace. To establish this more concretely, Mitchell offers an 
extended discussion of The Interior Castle of Teresa of Avila as a way 
of exploring Takeuchi’s claim. Spiritual transformation happens 
where asceticism and mysticism meet. Mitchell succeeds in opening up 
a wealth of possibilities for future discussion. On the Buddhist side, we 
might compare DOgen’s teaching on the non-duality of practice and at­
tainment with Shinran’s concerns about hakarai (calculation). How 
might this intra-Buddhist discussion illuminate Christian questions re­
garding ascetics and mysticism?
As religions, Christianity and Buddhism are neither utterly different 
nor fundamentally the same. Why, we must ask, do such extreme posi­
tions about their relationship have such wide currency? We need to 
seek the middle ground which honors differences while noting similari­
ties and which takes both seriously. Therefore, skill in making compari­
sons is important. The value of Mitchell’s effort is that he has not been 
content merely to catalogue differences, nor even to juxtapose similar­
ity and difference. He has engaged in a form of Christian theology, 
a normative quest for truth. Throughout the entire book lies the 
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presumption that the truth is dangerous but redemptive. It is dan­
gerous in that it requires us to change. It is redemptive in that it empow­
ers us to change wisely. If this book only suggests ways to remain vul­
nerable to the truth, Donald Mitchell will have succeeded admirably.
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